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Solidarity and Rights: Two to Tango-A Response to
Joseph A. McCartin
Lance Compa
Cornell University
Thanks to Joseph McCartin for advancing this debate with an insightful critique
of the workers’-rights-as-human-rights framework and for his generous treat-
ment of the series of Human Rights Watch reports in which I had a hand.1
McCartin so fairly presents the human rights case, even while disagreeing
with it, that it’s hard to respond without simply borrowing from his framing of
my own views. But I’ll try.
Let’s take the demise of the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) as a con-
crete point of departure. I have a different take than McCartin on the US labor
movement’s main advocacy pitch for EFCA. I participated in meetings and con-
ference calls with union strategists who decided not to highlight a human rights
case. They made a specific choice to downplay fundamental rights in favor of
economic themes.
Based on polling and focus groups, union decision makers judged that a
rights argument was too abstract, too soft, too armchair-liberal to sway
Congress and public opinion. They opted for a hard-hitting call to build union
power to raise wages and restore the middle class. They thought that this econ-
omic pitch would resonate more in the raging economic crisis of 2009, when
corporations were on the defensive. Congress should make it easier for
unions to organize not because organizing is a fundamental right, but because
more unions will bring higher wages, greater purchasing power, and economic
recovery.
The AFL-CIO’s core EFCA briefing message for members of Congress at
the height of its campaign in 2009 was titled “What the Freedom to Join Unions
Means to America’s Workers and the Middle Class,” and captures this emphasis
on the economic theme:
America cannot be a successful low-wage consumer society. Our country needs
more money to go to America’s workers and less to Wall Street speculators and
CEOs. . . . Denying Americans the freedom to form unions is not just unfair, it
is destructive economic policy. With deunionization, we have set off a long-term
downward spiral of lower wages and fewer benefits. . . . As companies fight to
cut costs, consumer demand falls, breeding recession and instability. . . . When
workers have the right to form unions, their lives improve and the larger
economy is healthier. . . . Unions and collective bargaining have been especially
important in giving workers access to health insurance and defined-benefit
pension plans.2
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We see a couple of nods to workers’ rights here, but the main focus is Keynesian,
not Kantian.
Fair enough. I can’t guarantee that an aggressive human rights strategy
would have prevailed either, though I do think that public response in
Wisconsin and other state battlegrounds over public-employee bargaining
rights in early 2011 suggests that a rights argument can get good traction in dis-
putes about labor policy. A national poll found that sixty-one percent of the
public opposed taking away collective bargaining rights for public employees.3
In any event, as McCartin fairly notes, my own argument is for a “skillful inter-
weaving” of economic and rights arguments, not opting for one over the other.
What prevailed in EFCA really was politics. Even with sixty Democrats in
the Senate in the first months of the new government, labor never had sixty
votes for EFCA with card check (polling also indicated we shouldn’t say
“card check” but “majority sign-up”; it doesn’t matter now). Instead of letting
it go at “majority sign-up” as if it were self-explanatory, unions could have
done a better job of explaining the card check system.
George McGovern was wrong when he said that card check opened the
door to intimidation of workers to sign cards. Labor law invalidates union
cards signed under pressure from organizers or coworkers, and the same rule
would apply under EFCA. Indeed, had EFCA passed, employers would
refuse to bargain, claiming that workers signed cards under pressure. They
would force unions into litigation in which every worker would have to testify
about the circumstances surrounding the card signing. But rather than explain-
ing and anticipating these developments, unions thought that arguing over the
intricacies of card check played to employers’ advantage. Simpler to say
“Majority sign-up will build unions and restore the middle class.”
EFCA might have gotten to sixty Senate votes on a version without card
check, like one with faster elections, “stronger remedies,” “equal time” access
for union representatives in the workplace, perhaps even first contract arbitra-
tion. But it never got to that point. Health care reform sucked up all the legis-
lative energy of Congress and all the lobbying energy of liberals, except for
union insiders.
EFCA and Original Sin
In a way, EFCA supporters replicated the original sin of the 1935 National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the bedrock labor legislation in the United
States. The NLRA’s Section 7 resoundingly affirmed workers’ rights to organize
and bargain collectively, but it grounded them in an economic foundation based
on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. That is, industrial strife resulting
from workers’ lack of organizing and bargaining rights created a “burden on
commerce” that Congress could address by granting such rights.
That may have been needed at the time to get past a constitutional chal-
lenge. We’ll never know for sure whether an NLRA grounded instead in First
Amendment rights of association or Thirteenth Amendment strictures on
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servitude would have gotten past the Supreme Court, though we can surmise
that the general strikes and sit-down strikes and other mass mobilizations of
the time might have swayed the court anyway.4
The commercial justification for the NLRA left unions vulnerable to chan-
ging economic and political winds. The time would come––and it did––when
policy makers and courts would see unions and collective bargaining, not
their lack, as a “burden on commerce.” This meant they could be restricted,
not being fundamental rights that can withstand shifting passions.
The economic basis for workers’ organizing and bargaining rights opened
the door for the antiunion Taft-Hartley reforms of 1947 and court decisions
that curtailed them. The 1947 act stripped union rights from low-level supervi-
sors and independent contractors, taking millions of employees out from even
the possibility of collective bargaining. It let states adopt “right to work” laws
to undermine union strength. It outlawed worker solidarity moves under the
rubric of “secondary boycotts.” It added an “employer free speech” clause per-
mitting managers openly and aggressively to campaign against employees’ orga-
nizing efforts in the workplace.
Court decisions went further. In the 1980s, when union membership fell
and prevailing values shifted away from industrial democracy and social solidar-
ity toward management control and global competitiveness, free market econ-
omic imperatives triumphed against workers’ organizing and bargaining. They
were not seen as fundamental rights, but as policy choices that could be
revoked. Strikebreaking with permanent replacements became widespread, sig-
naled by Ronald Reagan’s treatment of the air traffic controllers.5
In landmark labor law decisions, the US Supreme Court decided that
workers have no right to bargain over an employer’s decision to close their
workplace. The Court said that employers need “unencumbered” power to
make decisions speedily and in secret because collective bargaining “could
afford a union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be
used to thwart management’s intentions.”6 In another case, the Supreme
Court found that workers have no right to receive information from trade
union organizers in a publicly accessible shopping mall parking lot because
the employer’s private property rights outweigh workers’ freedom of associ-
ation.7 At one point, the Supreme Court said frankly that the rights to organize
and bargain “are not protected for their own sake but as an instrument of the
national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife.”8
When NLRA policy supposedly came in conflict with immigration policy
under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the Supreme Court
declared IRCA the winner. Denying a back pay remedy for undocumented
workers unlawfully fired for union organizing, the Court decided that immigra-
tion policy trumps protections for workers organizing and bargaining. In effect,
rather than viewing the NLRA as a guarantee of basic rights, the Court saw it as
just another policy option, one that must yield to immigration policy.9
Fast-forward to the EFCA battle. Prioritizing economic arguments for
union growth did two things. First, it left a partial vacuum into which employers
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rushed with their own instant human rights organizations and phony case for
“rights,” well described by McCartin. Second, it invited economic counterargu-
ments about unions putting new costs and burdens on employers and making
firms less competitive. Here’s how the Chamber of Commerce responded to
the unions’ economic frame:
EFCA suddenly became economic pixie dust which when sprinkled by benevolent
union leaders would raise wages, create jobs, and rebuild the middle class. Trust
me, if rapidly increasing union membership was the key for recovery and shared
prosperity I would be out there organizing. But this bill will make it more difficult
for businesses to adapt and innovate. Increasing unemployment and stifling job
growth is exactly the wrong prescription for our ailing economy.10
I don’t concede that “rights talk” gives employers an inherent advantage, any
more than “economics talk” gives advantage to unions. Both are fields of
contest, and labor advocates have to fight it out on each front. McCartin is
correct that the human rights case is not a panacea for labor. But this is not a
reason to drop it. Capitalism brooks no panaceas for workers and unions.
They must struggle constantly, often defensively, and sometimes losing and
coming back to fight another day.
The Importance of Alliance
Building alliances is an important part of the fight. Organized workers cannot
achieve their goals alone, even with high degrees of union strength and solidar-
ity, in a political and economic system stacked against them. The human rights
case reaches out to an important intellectual and social movement that can join
civil rights, religious, feminist, immigrant rights, and other allied forces in
support of labor’s struggles and labor’s goals.
As McCartin notes, the human rights argument resonates more forcefully
in other regions of the world than it does in the United States. I know that it’s
a struggle to have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and core labor
standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO) taken seriously in
the United States. Even most labor partisans know little about them. But in
most of the rest of the world, they are taken seriously inside and outside
labor movements. Trade unions and allied groups are strongly attuned to
human rights arguments and knowledgeable about ILO standards.
In a 2009 webinar with European “socially responsible investment” fund
officials on US-style union busting by European firms, the fund managers
wanted to know how US labor law failures and management abuses violate
ILO standards and human rights norms. I put the analysis in those terms. But
I do not think that we should compartmentalize arguments, stressing economics
and solidarity and industrial democracy at home and human rights abroad. We
should consistently make the whole case everywhere.
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Human Rights, Solidarity Rights, and US Labor Law
A human rights argument defending individual rights does not preclude equally
honoring a right to solidarity. Human rights advocacy for workers and unions
goes beyond classic individual rights because freedom of association at work
inherently takes on a collective character. The rights of individual workers
can only be realized collectively.
US labor law on its face is consistent with this view of workers’ human
rights. To begin, the NLRA only protects “concerted activity” by two or more
employees. An individual worker acting alone is unprotected. Second, the law
grants unions exclusive representation––one union speaks for all workers in a
defined bargaining unit, even where subgroups or individuals are antiunion or
would prefer another union. Third, except in “right to work” states, the law
permits “union security” fee payments in lieu of union dues for represented
workers who choose not to join the union (and contrary to employers’ propa-
ganda, only where employers agree to such a clause––the law does not
require it). “Compulsory union membership” is unlawful. No worker in the
United States can be compelled to join a union. “Union shop” or “agency
shop” clauses in collective bargaining agreements only require payments
equal to union dues, and nonmembers are entitled to a rebate of sums not
related to their representation by the union.
Furthermore, when a union is “designated or selected” (not “elected,”
which is nowhere in the law) by workers as their bargaining agent, the coercive
power of the state forces unwilling employers to the negotiating table with a
duty to bargain in good faith. I know, I know, employers are scofflaws, penalties
are weak or nonexistent––the Human Rights Watch reports are all about that.
The human rights argument––and more specifically Human Rights Watch
in its series of reports on how US labor law fails to meet international standards
on freedom of association––does not call into question these
solidarity-enforcing features of the American labor law system. They are com-
patible with freedom of association principles. The International Labor
Organization, the authoritative body that sets and interprets international stan-
dards, allows great diversity in countries’ labor law systems based on their par-
ticular histories and industrial relations traditions.
Countries can choose to have exclusive representation or multiple
unionism; to permit union security clauses or “open shops” where no one
must pay dues; to force unwilling employers to bargain or let them refuse to
bargain (as long as workers are free to strike to compel bargaining––the
pre-NLRA state of labor law in the United States). The ILO countenances
the French system, for example, which has multiple unions in what we would
call a bargaining unit and is entirely “open shop” in the American sense––
fewer than ten percent of French workers represented by unions pay any
union dues at all.
Employers, not Human Rights Watch or other human rights advocates
inside or outside the labor movement, are pushing a rigidly individualistic
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rights argument. Its logical conclusion would let management bribe workers to
renounce union representation or refuse to bargain with unions altogether.
But because a human rights framework starts with the individual does not
mean we should leave the field clear to employers to push their version of
workers’ rights. Human rights advocates have to push back, insisting that collec-
tive rights of workers in the employment context are also an exercise of funda-
mental human rights. Individual rights are a starting point, but these rights can
only be exercised and realized as a group.
It is not a question of pitting one set of rights against another, but of pitting
one version of rights embracing both individual and collective interests against a
pinched, self-serving version that deprives workers of their right to defend them-
selves through organization and collective bargaining––the only way workers
can vindicate their rights.
As McCartin explains and as I concede, the human rights argument is not a
guaranteed winner. We can’t just cry “human rights violations” and expect
Congress and courts to fall over. Given the general lack of understanding of
and familiarity with human rights discourse in the United States, we can’t
expect to prevail instantly in the court of public opinion, either. We do have
to find ways to blend the human rights argument into frames of industrial
democracy, solidarity, and the common good in the “recalibration” project sig-
naled in McCartin’s paper. All aboard.
Final Notes
It’s a little disjointed, but I have thoughts on a couple of other points. First, I
don’t agree with Nelson Lichtenstein’s suggestion, seconded by McCartin,
that the 1960s civil rights movement and the push for Title VII and other indi-
vidual rights-oriented employment legislation caused the decline in union mem-
bership between then and now. It’s a neat formula, but one based on
coincidence, not causation.
Public sympathy for unions grew substantially from the 1990s to the
mid-2000s (it fell after the 2008 economic crisis). Unions’ “win rate” in NLRB
elections rose for ten consecutive years between 1997 and 2007, from just
below half to a two-thirds success rate. The rate of decline in union membership
slowed during the same period, and it actually ticked up in 2008 from 12.1 to 12.4
percent before dropping again in the wake of the economic crisis. But I wouldn’t
argue that labor’s gains during these years were because that’s when the
human-rights-are-labor-rights argument began gaining traction.
Most of the labor movement supported the individual rights movements of
the 1960s and ‘70s, and they were right to do it. A web of individual employment
protections underpins effective collective bargaining. Continued insistence on
collective power rather than individual rights would have left unions in a nar-
rower corner, even more vulnerable to attack as privilege-protecting special
interests. The alliance-building that took place then still pays dividends for
workers and their unions. Another lesson can be learned, too: We did not win
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by insisting that it would help the economy. The
rights argument was uppermost.
Other forces drove down union “density”: the shift away from long-term
work in basic industries toward job-hopping service work; jobs shifts from the
Rust Belt to the Sun Belt; management’s ability to thwart new organizing
under weak labor laws; changes in the composition of the labor force that saw
millions more “independent contractors” and fake managers and supervisors
excluded from collective bargaining rights, and more.
Add to this mix 3.5 million temp agency workers and millions of public
employees in states that prohibit public employee collective bargaining, and
some forty million American workers don’t even have a choice to bargain col-
lectively. Removing them from the numerator in calculating the percentage of
workers in unions would double the union “density” rate, taking it over
twenty percent of the “organizable” labor force. Indeed, tackling the problem
of exclusions from collective bargaining rights would do more to restore trade
union strength than almost any legislative reform.
Second, although McCartin is the historian and I am not steeped enough in
original sources to be able to cite them, my impression is not the same as his, that
“the concept of ‘workers’ rights’ did not play a significant role in the arguments
of the labor reformers who laid the foundations for industrial unionism or the
Wagner Act.” Like all persons, workers have an innate sense of “rights” that
they invoke when they feel oppressed.
Seth Luther, in his famous 1832 “We have borne these evils by far too
long” speech on Massachusetts sweatshops said, “We know the difficulties
are great, and the obstacles many; but, as yet, ‘we know our rights, and
knowing, dare maintain’ . . . we wish nothing but those equal rights which
were made for us all.” I think that labor activists in the 1920s and 1930s
argued a rights case alongside their industrial democracy case in a “skillful
interweaving” of workplace democracy as a fundamental right––”lawful, con-
stitutional, natural, and inherent rights,” as Samuel Gompers put it.11 One
need look no further than to Section 7 of the NLRA and its assertion of
labor “rights”––not powers or abilities or capacities––to see that the “rights”
concept was important.
Finally, and here I agree with McCartin, we have to tackle the problem of
unions’ image in popular culture. It is certainly not helped by repeated episodes
of labor leader venality, which is no worse or more frequent than corporate or
government corruption, but reinforces negative impressions.
A deeper problem is the individualistic nature of mass entertainment. Most
novels and TV shows and movies are about people with money. Even when they
are not, they focus on central characters struggling alone against adversity. As
McCartin notes, On the Waterfront is a classic of the kind. More recently,
when Richard Linklater made a 2006 film based on Eric Schlosser’s Fast Food
Nation, about abusive conditions in a meatpacking plant, the idea of union orga-
nizing never made it to the screen. The central character improved her lot by
sleeping with her supervisor.
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Novelists by definition work alone. Filmmakers need support teams, but
they still see their work as auteur-ship. TV writers work in teams, but the dra-
matic hook of TV series is always individual characters and their crises. When
union reps show up, it’s the PBA lawyer representing the corrupt cop. We do
need to find ways to weave the positive side of unions into popular culture.
But with no Smartphone, no Facebook, no Twitter, and no Netflix, I’m the
last person to figure out how.
NOTES
1. Let me call readers’ attention to a new HRW report published in September 2010, A
Strange Case: Violations of Workers’ Rights in the United States by European Multinational
Corporations. It tells how high-profile German, British, French, and other European firms
who loudly proclaim their support for workers’ organizing and bargaining rights at home
adopt American management-style union busting in their US operations. See http://www.hrw.
org/en/reports/2010/09/02/strange-case-0.
2. See http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/voiceatwork/efca/whyunion.cfm.
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Evils.aspx.
4. James Pope at Rutgers Law School has done the most original work on the struggles
over drafting, passage, and constitutional support for the NLRA. See James Gray Pope,
“The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of
American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957,” Columbia Law Review 102 (2002). He suggests
that the Supreme Court was really responding to massive social pressures of workers’ organiz-
ing and strikes, including sit-down strikes, and that “there is no a priori reason to believe that––
had the justices been presented with an argument based on the Thirteenth Amendment instead
of the Commerce Clause––they would not have chosen to uphold the Act on that ground.”
5. See, for example, Jonathan D. Rosenblum, Copper Crucible: How the Arizona Miners’
Strike of 1983 Recast Labor-Management Relations in America (1995).
6. See First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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8. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50
(1975).
9. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
10. Thomas J. Donohue, US Chamber of Commerce, Politico Debate: the Employee Free
Choice Act, www.politico.com/arena/archive/efca.html.
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